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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-No Free Ride to the Schoolhouse
Gate: Equal Protection Analysis in Kadrmas v. Dickinson
Public Schools

I. INTRODUCTION
In Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools' the United States Supreme Court held that a North Dakota statute allowing public school
districts to charge parents a fee for bus service does not violate the
equal protection clause.2 The Court refused to apply either a strict
or a "heightened" level of scrutiny to the statute' and, applying
the rational relation test,4 found that the state had a legitimate
purpose in enacting such legislation.' Rather than applying a more6
flexible standard for equal protection analysis in education cases,
the Supreme Court in Kadrmas resumed a close adherence to a tierselection analysis of equal protection in education." By rejecting more
flexible approaches which may depend "less on choosing the 'formal
label' under which the claim should be reviewed," 8 the Court has
returned to a rigid tiers-of-scrutiny methodology for equal protection
claims, and issued a dark reminder of its holding in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez9 that education is not a
fundamental right.' 0 As the first decision involving equal protection
in education from a Court much changed since Rodriguez," Kadrmas
presents a current view-of the Court's thinking about both equal
protection and education.

1. 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988).
2. Id. at 2491.
3. Id. at 2489. Levels of scrutiny in equal protection analysis are discussed infra at notes
29-33 and accompanying text.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. The analysis of "tiers," or levels of scrutiny, stems from the Warren Court's expansion

of equal protection analysis in areas beyond race. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 Hxav. L. REY. 1, 8 (1972).

7. It had been suggested that the Court, following its employment of a "heightened"
level of scrutiny in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), would no longer rely on tiers of
scrutiny to analyze equal protection claims but, rather, would balance the competing interests
at stake. Hutchinson, More Substantive Equal Protection? A Note on Plyler v. Doe, 1982
Sup. Cr. REv. 167, 193. Kadrmas demonstrates that the tiers-of-scrutiny approach is alive
and well.
8. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2492 (Marshall, J.,dissenting) (quoting City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 478 (1985) (Marshall, J.,dissenting)).
9. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
10. Id.at 34-35.
11. Justice Douglas was replaced by Justice Stevens; Justice Stewart was replaced by
Justice O'Connor; Chief Justice Burger was replaced by Justice Scalia; and Justice Powell,
who wrote the Court's opinion in Rodriguez, was replaced by Justice Kennedy.
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State of North Dakota has traditionally encouraged its sparsely
populated school districts to consolidate with other districts, or
"reorganize," in order to more efficiently provide educational services. 1 2 In 1979, North Dakota enacted a statute allowing nonreorganized school districts to charge parents a fee for busing their
children to school. 3 Under the statute, the Dickinson public school
district, as a nonreorganized district, 4 required parents whose children
rode the district's buses to pay approximately eleven percent of the
bus service cost.' 5
The Kadrmas family was a poor North Dakota family with two
preschool children and a third child, Sarita, who attended a public
elementary school in the Dickinson school district.' 6 The family lived
16 miles from Sarita's school, and, until 1985, agreed to pay Dickinson a required fee of $97 to bus Sarita to the school.' 7 In 1985
the Kadrmases refused to pay the feel8 and incurred private transportation costs of over $1000.'9 In 1987 they resumed their contract
with Dickinson to bus Sarita. 0
Sarita and her mother filed suit against the Dickinson Public
Schools in state court in September 1985, seeking to enjoin Dickinson

12. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2484.
13. N.D. CENT. CODE 15-34.2-06.1 (Supp. 1989). The statute provides:
Charge for bus transportation optional. The school board of any school
district which has not been reorganized may charge a fee for schoolbus service
provided to anyone riding on buses provided by the school district. For
schoolbus service which was started prior to July 1, 1981., the total fees
collected may not exceed an amount equal to the difference between the
state transportation payment and the state average cost for transportation
or the local school district's cost, whichever is the lesser amount. For schoolbus
service started on or after July 1, 1981, the total fees collected may not
exceed an amount equal to the difference between the state transportation
payment and the local school district's cost for transportation during the
preceeding school year. Any districts that have not previously provided transportation for pupils may establish charges based on costs estimated by the
school board during the first year that transportation is provided.
14. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2485.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. The Kadrmases refused to pay for two reasons. First, they fell behind in arranged
payments on the busing fee and, at the time of refusal, were heavily in debt for this and
other expenses. Joint Appendix, Transcript of Proceedings at 30; Brief for the Appellants
at 5. Second, the North Dakota Supreme Court .held in Bismarck Public Schools v. Walker,
370 N.W.2d 565 (N.D. 1985) that signing the busing fee contract constituted a waiver of
any objection to the fee. Thus, signing the contract would have foreclosed the Kadrmases'
challenge. Brief for the Appellants at 9.
19. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2485. These costs resulted from driving Sarita to school in
the family truck and carpooling with a neighbor. Expenses from gasoline were approximately
$114 per month, and replacement of the truck's engine cost $800 during the school year.
Brief for the Appellants at 7.
20. 108 S. Ct. at 2485.

Winter 19901

CONSTITUTIONAL LA W

from charging them a fee for busing. 2' The plaintiffs claimed that
the statute violated the North Dakota Constitution's establishment
of a system of free public schools22 and that the statute also violated
the equal protection clause2 of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution.
The trial court dismissed the action on the merits,2 4 and the
Kadrmases appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court. The supreme court affirmed the trial court ruling and held that the North
Dakota Constitution did not require school districts to provide free
transportation2 The court also rejected the claim that the statute
26
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to
consider the equal protection claim 27 and subsequently affirmed the
8
2
North Dakota Supreme Court.

III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Equal Protection Analysis in Education
The Supreme Court's three-tiered approach to equal protection
claims is well-known if nQt well-understood in its application. The
' 3
30
and "middle tier
tests of "rational basis," ' 29 "strict scrutiny,"

1

have entered the lexicons of law students and legal scholars while,
at the same time, the Supreme Court itself has sought to define

21. Id.
22. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 402 N.W.2d 897, 899 (N.D. 1987), aff'd, 108
S. Ct. 2481 (1988).
23. Id.at 902.
24. Id. at 898.
25. Id. at 902.
26. Id. at 903.
27. 108 S. Ct. 63 (1987).
28. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2491. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in which
Justices White, Scalia, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice Marshall and
Justice Stevens filed separate dissents.
29. Justice O'Connor explained that, under this test, "the Equal Protection Clause is
offended only if the statute's classification 'rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective,"' Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2489 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961)), and "'we will not overturn such a statute unless the varying
treatment of different groups is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of
legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational."'
Id. (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
30. A statute "provokes 'strict judicial scrutiny' because it interferes with a 'fundamental
right' or discriminates against a 'suspect class,"' Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2487 (quoting San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973)).
31. "This standard of review, which is less demanding than 'strict scrutiny' but more
demanding than the standard rational relation test, has generally applied only in cases that
involved discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy." Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at
2487. Justice O'Connor noted that although Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) "did not
fit this pattern," the Court in Plyler "concluded that the State had failed to show that its
classification advanced a substantial state interest" and the case was limited to its .'unique
confluence of theories and rationales."' Id. at 2487-88 (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 243).
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and redefine these terms.3 It is not surprising, therefore, that modern
equal protection jurisprudence has engendered significant amounts
of legal commentary. Numerous commentators have noted both the
rigidity of the approach and inconsistencies in application3 3 as the
Court has struggled with a variety of new and complex equal protection claims over the past two decades.
The Court's decisions involving education have proved to be fertile
ground for articulating the framework for equal protection analysis.
34
As the principal example of this, Brown v. Board of Education,
holding unconstitutional widespread school segregation, stands as
the Court's most sweeping pronouncement of equal protection rights.35
Prior to Brown and the few education cases leading up to that7
opinion,36 the "separate but equal" principle from Plessy v. Ferguson"
served as the Court's equal protection doctrine in education whenever
race was at issue.3" Although Brown held that "in the field of public
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place," 3 9 the
decision can be seen as the watershed of the Court's march from
recognizing the potential unconstitutionality of racial classifications 4
to actually applying an equal protection standard that was 'strict'
in theory and fatal in fact."' Indeed, considering the Court's repeated rejection of "separate but equal" in areas unrelated to education, 42 Brown demonstrates the unique place of education in the
Court's jurisprudence as a platform for shaping constitutional prin43
ciples.

32. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 98 (Marshall, J.,dissenting); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
33. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 6, at 8; Hutchinson, supra note 7, at 193; Note, Justice
Stevens' Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 100 HARv. L. Rav. 1146 (1987).
34. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35. Id. at 495 ("[W]e hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the
actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
36. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
37. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
38. See Cumming v. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (rejecting black taxpayers' challenge
to a tax assessment for support of a white-only high school after a black high school was
closed).
Between Plessy and Brown, fewer than 300 education cases were brought before all federal
courts and, of these, a very small percentage were heard by the Supreme Court. J. HooArN,
THE SCHOOLS, THE COURTS, ANtD TH PUBIuc IrERSr 11 (1985).
39. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
40. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
41. Gunther, supra note 6, at 8.
42. See, e.g., Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954), vacating
and remanding, 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953) (parks); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350
U.S. 877 (1955), aff'g, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (beaches); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S.
903 (1956), affg, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D.Ala. 1956) (buses).
43. Other of the Court's education cases that do not involve equal protection also support
this point. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (religion); Hazelwood School
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988) (freedom of speech).
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The Court has frequently used education cases to consider heightened scrutiny for equal protection claims in areas beyond race.
Classifications based on gender," alienage, 4 and wealth" have all
been explored within the context of education. 47 This convergence
of education with equal protection claims suggests more than mere
coincidence. Rather, prior to Kadrmas, education cases appeared to
be particularly troublesome for the modes of equal protection analysis
that developed following Brown. This difficulty stemmed from the
Justices' views of the interest at stake in such cases" and became
most apparent in the Court's opinions in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez49 and Plyler v. Doe.5 0
In Rodriguez the Court examined whether the school financing
plan of the State of Texas, by allowing wealthy school districts to
provide greater per-child resources than poor districts, violated the
equal protection clause." In determining whether it should apply
strict scrutiny, the Court first noted the difficulty in defining the
class of "poor" persons affected. 2 Regardless of whether the "poor"
are a suspect class, reasoned the Court, a discriminatory classification
based on poverty has two distinguishing characteristics: the class
must be completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and
must be absolutely deprived of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy
that benefit." Finding that in no case were poorer districts completely
deprived of the educational benefit, the Court concluded that no
4
suspect class was disadvantaged.

44. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
45. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979);
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
46. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
47. Classifications based on illegitimacy have also been subjected to greater scrutiny,
although not in educational settings. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (striking
down statute that denied illegitimate children the right to sue for wrongful death of parent);
Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (one year statute of limitations for establishing
paternity for child support held unconstitutional).
48. Justice Powell noted this concern in his opinion in Rodriguez: "It is this questionwhether education is a fundamental right, in the sense that it is among the rights and liberties
protected by the Constitution-which has so consumed the attention of courts and commentators in recent years." 411 U.S. at 29.
49. 411 U.S. 1.
50. 457 U.S. 202.
51. 411 U.S. 1. Mexican-American parents of children in the Edgewood School District
in San Antonio brought the suit, arguing that the state educational financing scheme provided
Edgewood schools with only $356 per pupil, whereas the financing scheme provided Alamo
Heights, another San Antonio school district, $594 per pupil. The differences could be
accounted for, in part, by the relative wealth of the two communities and their differences
in tax base.
52. Id. at 19. The Court noted that the record offered no definition of the disfavored
class but identified three potential classifications for "poor": (1) persons whose incomes fall
below a given level; (2) persons who are relatively poorer than others; and (3) all persons,
regardless of income, who live in relatively poorer school districts. Id. at 19-20.
53. Id. at 20.
54. Id. at 28. The Court also noted that the "large, diverse, and amorphous class" had
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The Rodriguez Court also, for the first time, squarely considered
the issue of whether education is a fundamental right, triggering
strict scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment. Writing for the
Court, Justice Powell explained that a fundamental right is one that
is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." Addressing
the argument that education bears a close relationship to other
constitutional freedoms like free speech and the right to vote, Justice
Powell noted that the Constitution does not guarantee "the most
effective speech or the most informed electoral choice."5 6 Finding
that there was no basis for affording education the status of either
an explicit or implicit constitutional right,' 7 the Court refused to
apply strict scrutiny to the Texas financing scheme."8 Under the
rational basis standard, the Court held that Texas' unequal perpupil expenditures did not violate the equal protection clause because
the state financing system rationally furthered a legitimate state
purpose in balancing local control of educational resources against
the state's interest in providing adequate minimum levels of education. 9
Thus, the Court in Rodriguez continued to rely on a two-tier
analysis of equal protection claims by refusing to consider wealth
classifications as suspect and applying a rational basis standard.
Moreover, the holding that education is not a fundamental right,
in spite of the often-quoted language from Brown that "'education
is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments,' 60 reflected the Court's unwillingness to apply strict scrutiny
to state statutes affecting education. The Court chose to rely on its
tier-selection approach to equal protection,6 ' rather than adopt a

"none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities,
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position
of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process." Id:
55. Id. at 33-34. Justice Powell prefaced this conclusion by stating: "Nothing this Court
holds today in any way detracts from our historic dedication to public education. . . . But
the importance of a service performed by the State does not determine whether it must be
regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause."
Id. at 30.
56. Id. at 36 (emphasis in original). The opinion also elaborated: "Even if it were conceded
that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to
the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication that the present levels of
educational expenditures in Texas provide an education that falls short." Id. at 36-37.
57. Id. at 35.
58. Id. at 39. The Court also pointed out that more deference should be given to the
state because the Texas financing system was implemented to extend rather than curtail
educational benefits; thus, the "affirmative and reformatory" nature of the system was an
additional reason for lowering the level of scrutiny. Id. at 37-39.
59. Id. at 48, 54-55.
60. Id. at 29 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
61. Of course, this is not to suggest that all of the Justices were satisfied with this analytic
approach. The most vocal of the dissenters in Rodriguez, Justice Marshall, clearly stated:
"I must once more voice my disagreement with the Court's rigidified approach to equal
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standard that would balance "the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is

drawn.'

'62

While this approach changed dramatically with the introduction
of a "middle tier" in Craig v. Boren6 3 the addition of a third tier
did little to clarify equal protection analysis.64 Not until Plyer v.

Does ' came before the Court for its hearing on the educational

deprivation of alien children did the Court seem to relax its adherence

to a rigid tiers-of-analysis approach.
Plyer presented the issue of whether the equal protection clause
was violated by a Texas statute that allowed school districts to deny

the children of illegal aliens the benefit of a free public education.6

In a five-to-four opinion written by Justice Brennan, 7 the Court
refused to find that illegal aliens constituted a suspect class," but

noted that the statute "imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete
class of children not accountable for their disabling status." ' 69 Citing
Rodriguez, the Court reaffirmed its holding that education is not
a fundamental right, 70 but explained that "neither is it merely some
governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social
welfare legislation' '7 since it "has a fundamental role in maintaining
the fabric of our society." '7 2 The Court employed a level of review
that was "properly heightened ' 7 3 and, failing to7 find a "substantial
state interest," '74 held the statute to be invalid. 1
Although in Plyer the Court acknowledged and employed "middle
tier" scrutiny in its equal protection analysis, 76 the Court chose

protection analysis." 411 U.S. at 98. Justice Powell himself noted that "with respect to state
taxation and education . . . this Court's action today is not to be viewed as placing its
judicial imprimatur on the status quo. . . . But the ultimate solutions must come from the
lawmakers and the democratic pressures of those who elect them." Id. at 58-59.
62. Id. at 99 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
63. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
64. See Seeburger, The Muddle of the Middle Tier: The Coming Crisis in Equal Protection,
48 Mo. L. Rzv. 587 (1983).
65. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
66. The statute, TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. Sec. 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1981), provided that
only children "who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens" were entitled
to the benefit of state funding and were required to be admitted to free public schools in
their districts of residence.
67. Justices White, Rehnquist and O'Connor joined Chief Justice Burger's dissent.
68. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19.
69. Id.at 223.
70. Id.
71. Id.at 221.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 238 (Powell, J.,concurring).
74. Id. at 230.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 217-218. As Justice Brennan explained, "This technique of 'intermediate' scrutiny
permits us to evaluate the rationality of the legislative judgment with reference to well-settled
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middle tier not only on the basis of the classification, as in gender
cases, 7 but also because of the nature of the interest at stake.78
Where previously neither alienage nor education had required heightened scrutiny, in Plyler the particular combination of education and
the alien status of children convinced the majority that something
more than a rational basis analysis was appropriate. 79 Thus, Plyler
seemed to represent a further repudiation of the inflexible two-tiered
analysis evident in Rodriguez, while at the same time appearing to
embrace the Rodriguez dogma that education is not a fundamental
right. By employing a heightened form of scrutiny to strike down
a statute depriving illegal alien children of a free education, Plyler
suggested the possibility that education, in consort with a second
factor, might serve to elevate the Court's scrutiny. The Plyler holding
thus produced a hope that the Court would broaden its use of the
middle-tier and perhaps abandon its tier-selection equal protection
analysis altogether.w
A second possible explanation of the Plyler holding, however, was
that it was sui generis and not a case whose rationale was analytically
defensible or easily generalizable." Specifically, Justice Brennan's
opinion may have reflected nothing more than his successful attempt
to build a coalition for overturning the Texas statute, rather than

constitutional principles. .
. Only when concerns sufficiently absolute and enduring can be
clearly ascertained from the Constitution and our cases do we employ this standard to aid
us in determining the rationality of the legislative choice." Id. at 218 n.16.
77. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
78. As Justice Brennan stated: "[Miore is involved in these cases than . . . whether [the
statute] discriminates against a suspect class, or whether education is a fundamental right....
[Wie may appropriately take into account its costs to the Nation and to the innocent children
who are its victims." 457 U.S. at 223-24. It has been suggested that this approach may have
reflected a movement in the Court toward Justice Marshall's "sliding scale" analysis. See
Hutchinson, supra note 7, at 170. In his concurring opinion in Plyler. Justice Marshall himself
pointed out that "the facts of these cases demonstrate the wisdom of rejecting a rigidified
approach to equal protection analysis, and of employing an approach that allows for varying
levels of scrutiny depending upon 'the constitutional and societal importance of the interest
adversely affected....'" 457 U.S. at 231 (quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973)).
79. One commentator described the test used in Plyler as "zero plus zero equals one;
that is, a nonsuspect classification plus a nonfundamental right requires almost strict scrutiny."
Hutchinson, supra note 7, at 193. The thrust of this argument is that the Court employed
a peculiar calculus whereby neither a nohsuspect classification nor a nonfundamental right
would allow heightened scrutiny, yet in combination they add up to a stricter standard of
review. In Hutchinson's view, the Texas statute in Piyler required heightened scrutiny because
of the specific combination of alienage (a nonsuspect classification) and education (a nonfundamental right). From his 1982 perspective, Hutchinson concluded that after Plyler, equal
protection analysis had lost its predictability since it was impossible to know, even aided by
prior case law, which particular combination of factors would trigger heightened scrutiny.
Id. at 192-93.
80. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 231 (Marshall, J.,concurring); Hutchinson, supra note 7, at
169, 193; Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 97071 (1987).
81. Tushnet, The Optimist's Tale, 132 U. PA. L. Rv. 1257, 1263 (1984).
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a serious effort to advance equal protection doctrine.82 The Court's
opinion in Kadrmas supports this latter view and demonstrates the
continuing vitality of the Rodriguez tiers-of-analysis approach.
B. The Analysis of Equal Protection in Kadrmas
The Kadrmas Court held that the equal protection clause is not
violated when a school district charges parents a fee for busing their
children to school.8 3 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor
began the Court's equal protection analysis" by considering whether
strict judicial scrutiny should be applied to the North Dakota statute.
The Court recited the requirements for strict scrutiny: whether the
statute "interferes with a 'fundamental right' or discriminates against
a 'suspect class."' ' 3 The Court quickly dismissed the argument that
the appellants were denied a fundamental right, 86 pointing to both
Rodriguez and Plyer to support the Court's continuing view 8 that
7
education is not a fundamental right triggering strict scrutiny.
The appellants also argued that the statute created a suspect
classification because of its unequal effects on the wealthy and poor. 88
Rejecting this argument, the Court stated that a statute's differing
effects on the wealthy 89and poor will not "on that account alone"
call for strict scrutiny.
The Court next considered the argument that "heightened" scrutiny
should be applied to the statute, pointing out that this standard has
generally had limited application to cases of discriminatory classifications of sex or illegitimacy. 9° Relying on Plyler, the Kadrmases

82. Id.
83. 108 S. Ct. at 2489.
84. Before reaching the merits, Justice O'Connor rejected the school district's argument
that the Kadrmases were estopped from asserting their claim because they had "enjoyed the
benefits" of the district's bus service. See id. at 2486. Dickinson moved to dismiss the appeal
by relying on the principle stated in Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947), and more
recently articulated in Strickland v. Flue-Cured Tobacco Co-op Stabilization Corp., 643 F.Supp.
310, 319 (D.S.C. 1986): "It is an elementary rule of constitutional law that one may not
'retain the benefits of the Act while attacking the constitutionality of one of its important
conditions."' Appellee's Motion to Dismiss Appeal at 3. The Court found that Sarita's benefit
of bus service derived from a different statute than that under attack, and, regardless, the
litigation resulted from a burdensome fee imposed by statute, not from a beneficial provision.
Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2486.

The Court also rejected Dickinson's argument that the case was moot since the Kadrmases
had subsequently signed two contracts for bus service. Justice O'Connor made it' clear that
a "case or controversy" existed and that "the ongoing and concrete nature of the controversy
• . . is readily apparent." Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2486-87.
85. Id. at 2487. See also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 1617 (1973); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-217.

86. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2487.
87. See Rodriguez. 411 U.S. at 16, 33-36; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.

88. See Brief for the Appellants at 25; Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2487.
89. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2487.
90. Id. (citing Clark v. Jeter, 108 S. Ct. 1910 (1988); Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976)).
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argued that the Court's teaching was that education is a right whose
possible infringement requires a "heightened level of attention." 9'
Justice O'Connor distinguished Plyler by noting that Sarita's parents
had engaged in no illegal activity that denied her access to education. 92
Moreover, the majority found no reason "to suppose that this user
fee will 'promot[e] the creation and perpetuation of a sub-class of
illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding 93to the problems and
costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime.'
To bolster their argument for a heightened level of scrutiny, the
Kadrmases cited prior cases which held that the government cannot
withhold from the poor certain important services, such as a trial
transcript in a criminal case. The Court found these cases irrelevant
since they involved access to judicial process as an exclusive remedy,
whereas the Kadrmases had alternative remedies to North Dakota's
imposition of a bus fee, such as their choice to transport Sarita
themselves."
Applying the rational relation test as the "appropriate"
level of
analysis, the Court began its inquiry with the observation that since
there is no constitutional requirement that states provide any bus
service, "it is difficult to imagine why choosing to offer the service
should entail a constitutional obligation to offer it for free." 97 The
Kadrmases argued that the equal protection clause also was violated
because the statute allowed only non-reorganized districts to levy a
bus fee, whereas reorganized districts were not permitted to do so,
and that no rational justification could be found for this distinction.
The Court, quoting Vance v. Bradley," reaffirmed the principle that
legislation will be struck down only if "'the legislative facts on
which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be
conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker, ' "10 and
concluded that the Kadrmases had failed to meet their 'heavy
burden' of showing that the statute was both "arbitrary and irrational." 101
The Court found that the statute, by distinguishing between reorganized and non-reorganized districts, justifiably sought to encourage voters to approve reorganization plans by relieving them of

91. Brief for the Appellants at 16.
92. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2488.
93. Id. (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230).
94. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Appellants also cited Smith v. Bennett, 365
U.S. 708 (1961), Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S.
56 (1972), and Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
95. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2488.
96. Id. at 2489.
97. Id.
98. See Brief for the Appellants at 18-22.
99. 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
100. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2490 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979)).
101. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2490 (quoting Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 332 (1981)).
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concerns about transportation costs. 02 Further, as Dickinson argued,
the purpose of the statute was to spread the cost of the service to
those who would most benefit from it.103 The statute dealt only with
non-reorganized districts because voters in reorganized districts, in
approving their statutorily-required reorganization plan, had already
approved some type of transportation system that did not include
the charging of fees; addressing the statute to reorganized districts
would have created an "obvious impairment of existing legal relationships."10 On this basis, the Court found that the only difference
between reorganized and non-reorganized districts is that in reorganized districts only the voters could approve a bus service fee,
whereas in non-reorganized districts the local school board may, on
its own authority, require a bus fee. 05 This difference, the Court
concluded, stemmed from voluntary agreements made by the voters
rather than any irrational basis in the statute, and therefore the
Court would find no equal protection violation.'0°
Justice Marshall dissented, disagreeing with the majority's analysis
and holding. 0 7 His dissent focused on whether the state's action
discriminated against the poor by not providing a basic education, 08
in contrast to the majority's focus on the provision of transportation
0 Justice
services.'0 9 Reminding the Court of his dissent in Rodriguez,"1
Marshall stated that he viewed the majority's opinion as a "retreat
from the promise of equal educational opportunity.""'
Rather than choosing labels by which the Court should analyze
equal protection claims, J.ustice Marshall preferred to focus on identifying and analyzing the real interests at stake." 2 Specifically, Justice
Marshall suggested that the Court should look to 'the character
of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals
in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that
they do not receive, 3 and the asserted state interests in support of
the classification.' 9
While acknowledging that classifications of wealth do not automatically require strict scrutiny, Justice Marshall pointed out that
wealth classifications do "have a measure of special constitutional
significance."" Moreover, Justice Marshall continued, the "extraor-

102. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2490.
103. Id.
104. Id.(quoting Brief for Appellees at 16).
105. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2490-91.

106. Id.at 2491.
107. Id. Justice Brennan joined Justice Marshall's dissent.
108. Id.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
411 U.S. at 71.
Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2491.
Id.at 2492.
Id. (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2492.
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dinary nature" of a person's interest in education "cannot be denied.""' 5 Finally, because the statute's justification rested solely on
fiscal considerations, the state's interest "is therefore insubstantial;
' 6
it does not begin to justify the discrimination challenged here." 11
Thus, for Justice Marshall, the statute created an unreasonable
obstacle to the advancement of the poor and frustrated the intent
of the fourteenth
amendment, which was "to abolish caste legis7
lation. "111
Justice Stevens' brief dissent applied his notion of the rational
basis test to the statute." ' He first identified the actual purpose
behind the statute's discriminatory classification as encouraging reorganization to improve the schools while relieving parents of concerns about transportation costs." 9 Given this purpose, it was
"perfectly clear" to Justice Stevens that bus service was an important
component of education in North Dakota and that, once districts
had voted to approve or disapprove of reorganization, no justification
remained for "allowing the nonreorganized districts to place an
obstacle in the paths of poor children seeking an education in some
parts of the State that has been removed in other parts of the
State."' 20 Thus, following his own criteria for rationality, 2' Justice
Stevens saw no rational basis to support the state's purpose. 22
C. Equal Protection and Education After Kadrmas
Kadrmas stands as a recent example of the Court's method of
applying the equal protection clause. The Court continues to analyze
equal protection claims by selecting one of three tiers of review.
However, unlike in the past when the tiers*of-analysis approach was
interpreted as sufficiently flexible to encompass "'unique
circumstances""' 2 that might allow for a 'unique confluence of
theories and rationales,"'' 2A the Court has returned to a rigid choice

115. Id. at 2493. Justice Marshall also stated, "'it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education' (quoting
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)), and noted that "education is not 'merely
some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation'
(quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)).
116. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2494 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 2493.

118. Id. at 2494-95. Justice Blackmun joined Justice Stevens' dissent.
119. Id. (citing the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in Kadrmas, 402 N.W.2d 897,
903 (N.D. 1987)).

120. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2495.
121. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens,
J., concurring) ("elements of legitimacy and neutrality that must always characterize the
performance of the sovereign's duty to govern impartially").
122. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2495.
123. Id. at 2488 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982) (Powell, J.,concurring)).
124. Id. (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 243 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
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of tiers for examining equal protection claims.125 Moreover, a majority of the Court now appears to have a clear understanding of
the limits of the equal protection
clause and of the analytic method
26

for selecting a tier of review.

Briefly, equal protection analysis, in the Court's present view,

requires a presumption of rational basis review.' 2 7 This presumption
can only be refuted and rational basis displaced by a higher tier of
review when one of the previously-recognized prerequisites exists.
Specifically, when the Court finds a fundamental right infringed or
a suspect class involved, it will apply strict scrutiny. 28 The Court
will employ "heightened," or middle-tier, scrutiny only when it
perceives classifications based on sex or illegitimacy. 129 As suggested
by Justice Marshall, the Court's analysis is now a "facile"' 3 0 approach that adheres to a rule-based analysis rather than a consideration of the competing state and individual interests.' 3
In Kadrmas, the Court eschewed the more flexible approach to
equal protection evident in Plyler'3 2 and more recent cases,' 3 3 an
125. Justice O'Connor noted at the outset that in upholding the statute the Court was
"raipplying well-established equal protection principles." Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2484.
126. "(W]e are evidently being urged to apply a form of strict or 'heightened' scrutiny to
the North Dakota statute. Doing so would require us to extend the requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause beyond the limits recognized in our cases, a step we decline to take." Id.
at 2487.
127. "Unless a statute provokes 'strict judicial scrutiny' because it interferes with a 'fundmental right' or discriminates against a 'suspect class,' it will ordinarily survive an equal
protection attack so long as the challenged classification is rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose." Id. (quoting San Antonio lndep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973)).
128. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2487.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2491 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
131. This latter method of analysis has been termed a "sliding scale" approach or a
"balancing" methodology. See Hutchinson, supra note 7, at 193; Aleinikoff, supra note 80,
at 971. Both of these commentators noted that Plyler represented a movement by the Court
toward the balancing of competing interests in equal protection review.
132. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 231 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring).
133. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(zoning ordinance requiring a special use permit for housing the mentally ill in a residential
area). The Court in Cleburne purportedly refused to apply middle-tier scrutiny to the ordinance,
yet the ordinance was "invalidated only after being subjected to precisely the sort of probing
inquiry associated with heightened scrutiny." Id. at 458 (Marshall, J.,concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Rather than relying on a traditional tier-selection analysis and upholding
the Cleburne ordinance on deferential rational basis grounds, the Court scrutinized both the
stated and actual purposes for the regulation. It has been suggested that this marked a shift
in equal protection doctrine by the Court toward a more stringent rational basis review that
focuses on impermissible legislative purposes. See Note, Still Newer Equal Protection: Impermissible Purpose Review in the 1984 Term. 53 U. Cm. L. REY. 1454, 1468-69 (1986).
Like Kadrmas, however, it may be that Cleburne represented nothing more than the Court's
dissatisfaction with the middle tier and a return to a simpler two-tier analysis. See infra notes
140-144 and accompanying text. Unlike Kadrmas, the rational basis review in Cleburne was
sufficiently flexible to strike down on substantive grounds the justifications offered by the
.city. As the Kadrmas Court stated: "Social and economic legislation like the statute at issue
in this case . . . 'carries with it a presumption of rationality that can only be overcome by
a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality."' 108 S. Ct. at 2489 (quoting Hodel v.
Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981)).
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approach that did not involve applying a tier of analysis in an
outcome-determinative fashion. Rather, it appears that the Court
has all but repudiated the Plyler analysis and reasoning. Although
the Kadrmas Court did not expressly overrule the approach taken
in Plyler, it clearly stated that Plyler's holding has not been extended
beyond its "unique circumstances,"' 34 and that Plyler's reasoning
could not be extended to cover the facts of Kadrmas.'3 It seems
clear that any vitality Plyler may have had for equal protection
analysis has been severely limited by the holding in Kadrmas. 3
More specifically, the Court in Kadrmas has signalled its unwillingness to employ middle tier scrutiny unless a governmental regulation discriminates on the basis of sex or illegitimacy.'" Indeed,
Kadrmas may indicate that a majority of the Court, by carefully
limiting middle tier analysis to these two types of classifications and
distinguishing Plyler, would prefer to abandon middle tier and its
return to the two-tiered equal protection
complexities altogether 3and
8
universe of Rodriguez.'
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,'19 the Court
discussed the circumstances in which it should apply intermediatelevel scrutiny. In Cleburne, the Court refused to designate the mentally retarded a "quasi-suspect class"' ' and refused to apply middle
tier scrutiny to a zoning ordinance which required a special use
permit for a group home for the mentally retarded. '14 The Court
concluded that the way to remedy invidious legislative discrimination

134. 108 S. Ct. at 2487-88 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
135. 108 S. Ct. at 2488.
136. The Court in Kadrmas stated that it did not "think that the case before us today is
governed by the holding in Plyler." Id.
137. Id. at 2487.
138. The majority's opinion cited Rodriguez in stating the general rule for an equal protection
violation: "Unless a statute provokes 'strict judicial scrutiny' because it interferes with a
'fundamental right' or discriminates against a 'suspect class,' it will ordinarily survive an
equal protection attack so long as the challenged classification is rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose." Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2487. This general statement of
the rule makes no mention of, or provision for, the application of middle tier scrutiny.
139. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
140. Id. at 442. The Court reasoned that a quasi-suspect classification was not justified
for four reasons. First, the varied needs of the mentally retarded is properly a matter for
legislatures guided by professionals, not for ill-informed judges. Second, legislatures should
be allowed flexibility in shaping remedies, free from excessive judicial oversight. Third, the
mentally retarded are not politically powerless because legislatures have responded to their
plight through legislation. Finally, if the mentally retarded were elevated to a quasi-suspect
status, "it would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other
groups." Id. at 442-45.
141. Id. at 446. Purporting to apply the rational basis test, the Court struck down the
zoning regulation, finding that it was based on "an irrational prejudice against the mentally
retarded." Id. at 450. However, the Court's analysis lacked the normal deference given to
government regulations under rational basis scrutiny. Rather, the Court closely scrutinized
the legitimacy of the city's purposes, examining both the city's stated and actual purposes.
Id. at 448-450; see Still Newer Equal Protection, supra note 133, at 1468-69.
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against such groups was not to designate new quasi-suspect classifications, but rather to examine whether the government
was ra42

tionaly justified in creating a particular classification.'

Clearly, the Cleburne Court sought to avoid any further expansion
of the tier-selection framework developed by use of the middle-tier
in Craig and Plyler. By discussing at length why middle-tier was
inappropriate, the Court seemed to be unwilling to broaden the
circumstances in which middle-tier might be employed.' 3 Although
the Court in Cleburne employed rational basis review in a particularly
rigorous fashion,'" the Court's approach suggests that, at least from
a doctrinal standpoint, the Court preferred to redefine equal protection problems in terms of only two tiers. Read more broadly and
with hindsight, the Cleburne Court may have been signalling the
demise of the middle tier.
In Kadrmas, the Court was unwilling to sanction any expansion
of the middle tier. Indeed, there was no indication in the majority's
opinion that education might be a quasi-fundamental right triggering
any form of heightened scrutiny. Rather, the Court quickly dismissed
the appellants' claim that the statute was entitled to heightened
scrutiny based on either the educational interest at stake or a classification of poor persons,'4 5 and easily selected rational basis as the
appropriate test.'"4
As a case involving education, Kadrmas also reflects the views of
a majority of the Court regarding the nature of educational rights.
However, these views are suggested as much in4 7what was left unsaid
in the opinion as in the holding of the case.'
The Court carefully distinguished transportation from education
and focused almost exclusively on the state's interest in regulating
transportation;'4 the opinion fails to consider important the fact
that the transportation involved bringing children to their schools.' 4 9

142. Justice White, writing for the majority in Cleburne stated:
[tihe appropriate method of reaching [instances of discrimination) is not to
create a new quasi-suspect classification and subject all governmental action
based on that classification to more searching evaluation. Rather, we should
look to the likelihood that governmental action premised on a particular
classification is valid as a general matter, not merely to the specifics of the
case before us.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
143. Id. at 441-46. See supra note 140.
144. Justice Marshall, concurring in part and dissenting in part, referred to the Court's
analysis as .'second order' rational basis review." Id. at 458.
145. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2487.
146. Id. at 2489.
147. After reaffirming the proposition that education is not a fundamental right, id. at
2487, the Court viewed the imposition of a bus fee as an example of "social and economic
legislation." Id. at 2489. Viewed from this perspective, the Court appeared to have little
need to directly address the educational aspects of the case.
148. See id. at 2488, 2490-2491.
149. See id. at 2491 (Marshall, I., dissenting).
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By focusing on the state's requirement of a user fee for transportation, the Court had little difficulty in upholding the statute under
rational basis review:
[W~e think it is quite clear that a State's decision to allow local
school boards the option of charging patrons a user fee for bus
service is constitutionally permissible. The Constitution does not
require that such service be provided at all, and it is difficult
to imagine why choosing to offer the service should entail a
constitutional obligation to offer it for free.'5 0
Moreover, by defining the deprivation in terms of transportation
rather than education, the Court aligned the case more closely with
those cases that upheld as rational the choice of a state to provide
certain services over others. 5' By narrowly construing the issue in
the case, the Court seemed less concerned with the question of
education than with exemplifying
rationality review within the tiers52
of-analysis framework.
In addition, the Court was unwilling to consider the North Dakota
regulation as an obstacle to educational attainment." Conspicuously
absent from the Court's opinion was any recognition that education,
while not a fundamental right, was an important right that previously
had received special solicitude. In contrast to both Rodriguez and
Plyler, where the Court recognized the vital role of education and
its particular importance where equal protection claims are concerned,'54 the Kadrmas majority made little mention of education

150. Id. at 2489.
151. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding state's payment of expenses
for childbirth, but not for non-therapeutic abortions); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)
(upholding denial of Medicaid benefits for abortion, but allowing funding for other medical
procedures for the poor).
152. It may be that Kadrmas presented the Court with too easy a case. Sarita Kadrmas
was not actually deprived of an education since she did find transportation for which her
parents paid far more than the required school district busing fee. 108 S. Ct. at 2485.
However, what if the fee had been for public school tuition? Or books and other essential
and required supplies? Such fees could clearly deprive poor children of an education. The
Court's two-tier analysis seems insufficient to handle such situations. Strict scrutiny would
not apply since the poor is not a suspect class, nor is education a fundamental right. Also,
a state may rationally be justified in spending its limited resources on services other than
education since there is no affirmative constitutional requirement that states provide education.
Moreover, following the reasoning of Maher, poor children unable to pay fees for education
would be no worse off for the deprivation than if a state were to choose to provide no
services at all. Cf. 432 U.S. at 481 (Burger, C. J., concurring). Although hypothetical, these
examples suggest both the analytical difficulties with a strict adherence to two tiers of equal
protection analysis and the evident social problems raised when a real deprivation of education
is at issue.
153. The majority noted that in spite of the fact that the Kadrmas family suffered economic
hardship by transporting Sarita, she continued to go to school, and such facts "do not imply
that the Equal Protection Clause has been violated." Kadrmas, 108 S.Ct. at 2488.
154. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973) ("Nothing
this Court holds today in any way detracts from our historic dedication to public education.");
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 234 (1982) ("Classifications involving the complete denial of
education are in a sense unique, for they strike at the heart of equal protection values by
involving the State in the creation of permanent class distinctions.").
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at all.," While such silence may be consonant with the majority's
view of the case as one involving transportation services, it does
bespeak a "retreat' 15 6 from the proposition that education is 'per-1 7
haps the most important function of state and local governments."'
IV. CONCLUSION
Kadrmas is the most recent example of the Supreme Court's
approach to equal protection in education. Much appears to have
changed in the Court's equal protection analysis since Plyler.1's The

present Court appears to have returned to a formulaic analysis of
tiers of scrutiny, eschewing a balancing approach that may more
easily accommodate careful consideration of the specific interests at
stake. Given the reminder from Plyler that "denial of education to
some isolated group of children poses an affront to one of the goals
of the equal protection clause: the abolition of governmental barriers
presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of
individual merit,"' 5 9 the Court's decision to overlook the educational
impact of the statute in Kadrmas is all the more surprising. By
failing to consider the educational interest at stake and simplifying
its approach to equal protection claims in education, the Court has
signalled its return to' rigid tier analysis of claims under the equal
protection clause.
JEFFREY JENKINS

155. Cf. 108 S. Ct at 2487.
156. Id. at 2491 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
157. Id. (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
158. Of course, the makeup of the Court has changed since Plyler as well. See supra note
11. It is interesting to note that all three cases, Rodriguez, Plyler and Kadrmas, were fiveto-four decisions. Since Justice Powell, who concurred in the majority opinion of Plyler, was
replaced by Justice Kennedy, who joined the Kadrmas majority, it is tempting to speculate
about both how Justice Powell might have ruled in Kadrmas and what Justice Kennedy's
views are on equal protection in education.
In Rodriguez. Justice Powell suggested that a total deprivation of educational opportunity
may present a meritorious argument for heightened scrutiny. 411 U.S. at 37. Also, Justice
Powell agreed that Plyler called for "heightened" review because of the penalty imposed on
children who were victims of their circumstances. 457 U.S. at 238. Coupling this with his
finding that the state's interest was insubstantial compared to the denial of education, id.
at 239, he arguably would have found, at a minimum, the need for closer scrutiny than
rational basis in Kadrmas.
Justice Kennedy's silent agreement with the majority in Kadrmas must speak for itself until
a future case allows him to write on the topic.
159. 457 U.S. at 221-222.

